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Abstract  
This paper examines voter attitudes and behaviour at the 2007 Australian federal 
election., using data from the Australian Election Study. It considers socio-
demographic factors as well as the role of policy issues and voter evaluations of the 
party leaders. The paper concludes that issues, such as the government's WorkChoices 
policy, as well as health and leadership contributed to Labor's victory. 
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Some months out from the Australian federal election of 2001 it appeared that the 
government of prime minister John Howard was under serious threat of losing. To a 
lesser extent, the same can be said of the 2004 election. On each occasion, however, 
the government pulled the proverbial rabbit out of the hat and engineered a turn-
around of its fortunes. Thus, when the Howard government again appeared to be in 
electoral trouble in the lead up to the 2007 election, pundits were cautious about 
predicting its demise. In the end, however, there was no rabbit to be found in the hat 
this time and the conservative Liberal-National party coalition government of over 
eleven years standing was soundly defeated by the Australian Labor Party under the 
leadership of Kevin Rudd.  
 As is invariably the case, a range of reasons for the defeat quickly arose after 
the election. For some the explanation lay in issues such as industrial relations, 
environmental concerns and interest rates, for others it was leadership, specifically the 
failure of the government to effect a leadership change prior to the election (Davis 
2008). The analysis in this chapter suggests that some of these explanations have 
validity but not others. The evidence indicates that, as anticipated by many, 
controversy over the government’s WorkChoices legislation meant that industrial 
relations played an important role in its defeat. Health and taxation, issues of 
perennial concern to voters, also had a significant impact on voting behaviour. 
Leadership was important as well, although a change of leadership from Howard to 
Peter Costello would have been highly unlikely to have helped the coalition’s cause. 
The Labor Party’s electoral fortunes were certainly boosted by the unusually high 
popularity of Rudd, yet Labor’s advantage could have been even greater had voter 
evaluations of its leader translated into a stronger impact on individual electoral 
choice.  
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In the background, behind the factors that registered a significant direct effect 
on the vote, lay a number of shifts in the relationship between socio-demographic 
variables and party support which collectively could be regarded as amounting to a 
‘normalising’ of electoral alignments in Australia following a period in which the 
coalition’s electoral dominance saw Labor’s support seriously undermined within 
groups that would normally favour it. But in 2007 there was a reaffirmation of support 
for the Labor Party among ‘heartland’ groups such as those in manual occupations, 
trade union members, members of the Catholic religious denomination and young 
voters.  
Attitudes to the campaign  
By waiting until mid-October to call the election, the prime minister left himself little 
room to exercise any element of surprise. He made use of the little manoeuvring he 
could by having a six week campaign, the second time in a row that he had made it 
longer than the minimum of just under five weeks. The amount of public attention to 
the campaign was greater than in recent elections, presumably because of the prospect 
of a change of government. The Australian Election Study (AES) permits a 
comparison of public orientations to the campaign in recent elections (for details on 
the AES, which forms the basis of the analysis in this chapter, see the appendix). 
Table 27.1 shows that 40% of the AES sample said they took ‘a good deal’ of interest 
in the 2007 election campaign overall, representing a sharp rise on the 30% recorded 
in 2004 and comparable to the 38% who showed similar levels of interest in 1998 -
although still well below the level recorded in the fiercely contested election of 1993, 
when nearly half the electorate expressed a good deal of interest (Bean and McAllister 
1997, 192-3). The proportion of people who ‘cared a good deal’ which party won the 
election also rose, but perhaps not by as much as might have been expected. In 2007, 
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76% said they cared a good deal, compared to 72% in 2004. Still, this is a large 
fraction of the electorate that feels strongly that the outcome matters. 
[Table 27.1 about here] 
The level of attention paid to the campaign in newspapers, television and radio 
increased as well and, as is consistently the case, television rated well above the other 
two mainstream media, followed by newspapers and then radio. We also included the 
internet in this question format for the first time, but it rated well behind the 
established media. The internet, though, is predictably growing as a medium for 
obtaining election news and information, as the next line in Table 27.1 shows. Since 
AES respondents were first asked whether they made use of the internet to get news 
or information about the election, in 1998, there has been an increase in those saying 
they did from 4% to 20% in 2007 (, 6% who and another 5% who used it many 
times), with quite a jump from 12% in 2004. In 2007, 5% said they used the internet 
many times for such purposes, with 6% saying they used it on several occasions and a 
further 9% using it once or twice.  
Consistent with the earlier data in Table 27.1 more people (46%) said they 
watched the televised leaders’ debate, held near the start of the campaign, than in the 
last two elections. Only a small percentage of the electorate (13%) thought Howard 
performed better than Rudd in the debate, with 60% awarding the contest to Rudd and 
a further 27% saying the two were about equal.  
For some time there has been evidence that the numbers of voters leaving their 
final voting decision until into the election campaign is increasing in various 
democracies (McAllister 2002). What has become clear in Australia, however, is that 
this trend, which did occur in the 1990s, is now in reverse. The substantial decline 
from 39% in 2004 to 29% in 2007, shown in Table 27.2, puts the proportion of late-
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deciding voters in Australia back to near the low levels of the 1980s (Bean and 
McAllister 1997, 194-5) and heading down towards the even lower levels of the 
1970s (Kemp 1973, 282). In 2007, close to three-quarters of the electorate had made 
up their minds about how to vote before the campaign got under way, in many cases 
well before then (55% said they had decided ‘a long time ago’). Similarly, the 
percentage saying that they seriously thought of giving their first preference vote in 
the House of Representatives to a different party from the one for which they 
eventually voted has also dropped back to low levels. When reflecting on the data on 
timing of vote decision and potential to waiver from the final vote choice, it is 
important to consider that there were almost certainly election-specific factors at play, 
which should produce some caution in interpreting the findings as indicating longer-
term trends. Tired of a government in power for over eleven years, voters appear to 
have made up their minds to change many months before the election was called (as 
consistently reflected in opinion polls throughout 2007) and found no reason to 
reverse this decision during the campaign.  
[Table 27.2 about here] 
 It is consistent with these findings that the slight decline in party identification 
observed in the late 1990s (Bean and McAllister 2000, 183) appears to have stalled. 
The percentage identifying with one of the major parties has remained at 77% for the 
last three elections after falling from over 80%. No more than one in six eschew a 
party identification altogether and the proportion of very strong party identifiers in 
fact seems to be on the rise, now up to a quarter of all party identifiers, from less than 
a fifth two elections ago. This reaffirmation of party identification within the 
Australian electorate, albeit at a lower baseline level than in the past, puts Australia at 
odds with many other countries, in which there has been a sustained decline in party 
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loyalties (White and Davies 1998; Dalton and Wattenberg 2000; Webb, Farrell and 
Holliday 2003).  
The only indicator in Table 27.2 to go against the general message of reduced 
volatility and stabilised levels of partisanship is the proportion who reported that they 
had always voted for the same political party. The 45% giving this response is down 
from the 50% recorded in 2004. If this measure represents a genuine reflection by 
voters on their electoral choice over many years, this decline could be explicable by 
the rise and decline of a number of minor parties and independents over the last 
decade or so, for whom some members of the electorate may have voted once or 
twice, as well as the passing of the baton of the main third party in Australian politics 
from the Australian Democrats to the Greens.  
Social structure and voting 
While relationships between social structure and voting are generally weaker than in 
the past, it remains of great interest to see the extent to which core socio-demographic 
indicators align with support for different political parties. In Table 27.3 we begin this 
process by considering gender, age, region and religion. Reviewing data from the last 
election, we reported that the traditional association between gender and party had 
disappeared (Bean and McAllister 2005, 323). This remains the case in 2007. Again 
in 2007, if anything the traditional pattern is reversed, with men now slightly more 
likely to vote for the Liberal or National parties than women. And as usual, the 
Greens derived slightly more support from women than from men.  
[Table 27.3 about here] 
 In 2004, the Labor Party fared poorly among young voters, in a reversal of the 
more usual recent pattern (Bean and McAllister 2005, 323-4). Table 27.3 shows that 
in 2007 Labor’s stocks were restored among young voters. This revival appears to 
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have come at the expense of both the coalition and the Greens to some extent, 
although the Greens still did relatively well among the two youngest age cohorts, as 
they usually do. The Liberal-National parties did progressively better among older age 
groups, while Labor did worse – again a reflection of usual patterns. 
 The moderate differentiation between urban and rural Australia normally 
observable in electoral data persisted in the 2007 AES. In combination, the coalition 
parties do better in rural Australia and the Labor Party does better in urban areas, with 
a differential of just under 10%. The Greens also do better in urban settings and, in 
2007, other minor parties and independent candidates on average received a higher 
vote in rural electorates.  
Some have argued that during the period of the Howard government’s tenure, 
religion has gained a higher profile in Australian politics than for many decades prior 
(Warhurst 2007). The lower section of Table  27.3 shows that the traditional 
associations between different religious denominations and support for the major 
political parties were solidly in evidence in 2007. Labor did best among Catholics, 
‘other’ religions and those with no religion, while the coalition did best among the 
major Protestant groups in the form of the Anglican and Uniting churches. Although 
such patterns are consistent features of Australian politics, what has differed in some 
recent elections is that, in a period of coalition electoral dominance, more Catholics 
have voted for the Liberal-National parties than for the Labor Party. In 2007, 
however, the ‘old alliance between Catholics and Labor’ (Warhurst 2007, 21) was 
restored, with 48% of Catholics voting Labor compared to 42% voting Liberal-
National. The coalition did worst among those with no religion, which is where the 
Greens usually do best, as they did this time. This respective weakness and strength of 
the coalition and the Greens is predictably reflected among those who never attend 
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church while, in terms of church attendance, Labor fares least well among the most 
frequent attenders. But the patterns of party support for church attendance groups are 
not strongly demarcated in these data, save perhaps for other parties and candidates, 
who appear to be particularly popular with frequent churchgoers. 
 Turning to Table 27.4, we see that a tendency that has developed over the last 
few elections for university-educated voters not to support the coalition was 
reinforced in 2007. Only 33% of those with university degrees reported giving their 
first preference vote in the House of Representatives to the Liberal-National parties, 
while a significant 16% gave their vote to the Greens and 47% to Labor.  
 [Table 27.4 about here] 
 In recent elections the results for occupation and party support have varied, 
with the index of class voting (the non-manual vote for the Labor Party subtracted 
from the manual vote for Labor) moving from 10% to 17% to 9% over the last three 
federal elections (Bean and McAllister 2000, 180; 2005, 325). This volatility in the 
level of class voting continued in 2007, with the index measuring 15%. One of the 
features of the 2007 result is that for the first time for many elections a majority of 
voters from manual occupations voted for the Labor Party (55%). The return to a solid 
showing of support among its traditional electoral base is a strong indicator of the 
healthy state of Labor’s revived electoral fortunes that underpinned its victory in the 
election. Among other things, this surge in support for Labor from manual workers 
helps account for the increase in the class voting index. Interestingly, there was a 
marked occupational effect in support for the Greens in 2007, with non-manual 
workers twice as likely as manual workers to register a vote for the Greens. This in 
turn served to depress the coalition vote among its traditional support base, so that 
appreciably less than half the non-manual group voted Liberal-National (46%). 
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 Table 27.4 also shows that the self-employed strongly favoured the coalition 
parties, while government employees strongly favoured Labor. Trade union members 
were 23% more likely to vote Labor than non-members and less likely to vote for the 
coalition by a similar margin. The 63% of union members voting Labor is the largest 
proportion recorded in the AES for many elections and is another indicator of the 
reaffirmation of support for Labor among its electoral heartland. 
The issue agenda 
One of the themes in recent electoral research on Australia has been that issues matter 
(Goot and Watson 2007). While this may seem self-evident to many, the conventional 
wisdom of academic political science of two to three decades ago was that election 
campaigns, and by implication the policy issues that were debated in them, made very 
little difference to the winning and losing of elections (see, for example, Aitkin 1982). 
As indicated in the introduction, post-election accounts pointed to the role of various 
policy issues that may have affected the outcome of the 2007 election, including 
interest rates, industrial relations and the environment. Table 27.5 lists fourteen 
prominent election issues together with the percentage of AES sample members 
saying the issues were extremely important to them when they were deciding about 
how to vote. The top rating issue will come as no surprise to anyone who has 
followed Australian elections closely over the last decade or more. Repeatedly, and 
irrespective of whether the parties make it a central focus of their campaigns, the issue 
of health and Medicare is the issue of most concern to voters. And so it was in 2007, 
with 76% of all voters saying the issue was extremely important. For Labor voters the 
proportion went even higher, to 83%. Interestingly, next on the list was management 
of water (70% rated it extremely important), which sends a strong signal of voter 
concern over the growing problem in Australia and elsewhere of managing this scarce 
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resource. In recent elections, education has been near the top of the list of issue 
concerns and so it was again, ranking third behind health and water management 
(with 68% seeing it as extremely important and again more so for Labor voters).  
 [Table 27.5 about here] 
 No other issue had as many as 60% calling it extremely important, but next on 
the list came the environment, with 59%, and then further behind again global 
warming and industrial relations, for which 51% rated them as extremely important. 
All of these issues were of more concern to Labor than to Liberal-National voters. 
Predictably, the environment, global warming and management of water were of most 
concern to supporters of the Greens. Given the focus over an extended period of time 
leading up to the election on the government’s WorkChoices program, it may seem a 
little surprising that industrial relations does not feature more strongly. However, 
these initial results on the importance attributed to issues is not always a good guide 
to which issues actually influenced electoral choice, as we see in the final section of 
the chapter.  
Next in order of importance came interest rates and terrorism (on 43%), 
followed by defence and national security, then taxation together with unemployment 
(39%), the war in Iraq and finally immigration followed by treatment of Aborigines. 
This last result would seem to imply that concern for the plight of Indigenous 
Australians continues to be limited among the wider public, at least in relation to 
electoral politics. The only partial exception appears to be among Green voters, of 
whom 50% rated treatment of Aborigines as an extremely important issue. When we 
compare the supporters of the major parties across the range of issues, on most of the 
issues Labor voters expressed stronger concern than Liberal-National voters. Only on 
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the issues of tax, immigration, defence and terrorism did more coalition supporters 
rate the issues as important.  
 In the last column of Table 27.5 we have another set of figures which show the 
party differential on each of the fourteen issues (the percentage difference between 
those saying Labor’s policies were closer to their own view and those saying the 
coalition’s policies were closer). A plus sign indicates a Labor advantage and a 
negative sign a Liberal-National advantage on the issue. These data demonstrate very 
clearly that the Labor Party had a strong advantage over the coalition on most issues. 
On only five of the fourteen issues did the Liberal-National parties have an advantage 
and in all cases the margins were quite slim. On six of the other nine issues, the 
balance of voter opinion favoured the Labor Party by very substantial margins. 
Moreover, all of the issues that aroused most concern for voters also had a 
preponderance saying that Labor’s policies were closer to their own views on the 
issue. Labor’s largest advantage was on the issue of global warming (with a 38% 
differential in its favour), followed closely by the environment more broadly and then 
education. Labor also had substantial advantages on health and Medicare, industrial 
relations and the war in Iraq and led by lesser margins on management of water and 
treatment of Aborigines. Only on defence and national security, unemployment, 
interest rates, and terrorism did the coalition have an advantage of any measure and 
these were all issues that did not rate very highly among voter concerns. Neither party 
had an appreciable advantage on taxation or immigration.  
Voter evaluations of the party leaders 
It is now well established that voter evaluations of party leaders play a consistently 
significant role in Australian elections, although there is little evidence of an increase 
in their impact over time (Senior and van Onselen 2008). Rather, the leadership 
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effects seem to vary according to the context of particular elections. While we have 
seen that certain policy issues were highly salient in the 2007 election campaign, there 
was also a strong focus on the leaders, partly because of the interest that developed in 
the performance of the new Labor leader, Kevin Rudd, and partly because of the 
unrest over John Howard’s leadership that had emerged within the government’s 
ranks in the lead up to the election.  
Table 27.6 shows very clearly that the Labor Party’s bid for election was 
boosted by the ascension of Rudd to the leadership. On a scale where zero represents 
a strong dislike, 5 represents a neutral position and 10 represents a strong liking for 
the leader, Rudd’s mean rating was 6.3, which is higher than any leader recorded in 
the elections studies since the beginning of the 1990s (Senior and van Onselen 2008, 
234) and has echoes of the popularity of Bob Hawke in his heyday in the 1980s. 
Howard was a full 1.2 points behind on the scale at 5.1. In his own right, Howard was 
not unpopular with the electorate, but his average rating was only just over the neutral 
point of 5 and his level of popularity had certainly declined since the previous 
election, when it sat at 5.7 (Bean and McAllister 2005, 327). Voter reaction to 
Howard was more strongly divided than for Rudd, or any other leader (as shown by 
the standard deviation figures). The contrast between the two leaders is reinforced by 
the figures for the parties they led. Rudd was clearly more popular than the Labor 
Party, while Howard rated behind the Liberal Party.  
[Table 27.6 here] 
 Any implication from the above discussion, however, that the coalition would 
have benefited from a change of leadership before the election would be misplaced. 
Peter Costello, the person who would certainly have replaced Howard, had the lowest 
rating of all the politicians measured in the survey of 4.1. Although we cannot know 
 14 
how the electorate may have reacted to Costello had he taken on the role of prime 
minister – and there may well have been a boost to his rating – it is difficult not to 
conclude from the evidence to hand that the coalition would have fared even worse in 
the 2007 election had a successful leadership challenge been mounted. By contrast, 
the deputy leader of the Labor Party Julia Gillard scored well for a secondary leader, 
even if she rated a good way behind Rudd. The fact that Gillard’s average popularity 
level of 5.2 was slightly ahead of Howard’s rating meant that Labor had their two 
leading politicians out-scoring the government in terms of leadership popularity. 
 Labor’s advantage on leadership is further reinforced by the figures in Table 
27.7. These show how well a list of leadership qualities was deemed to describe each 
of the two major party leaders. Rudd outscored Howard on all but two of the nine 
items on the list. Howard’s best qualities were perceived to be his intelligence, 
knowledge, strength of leadership and competence and it was on the last two that he 
outscored the leader of the opposition, though not by a large margin in either case. 
Rudd scored particularly well on intelligence, compassion, being sensible and 
knowledgeable. Rudd was thus deemed to have some of the same strengths as the 
prime minister, but virtually none of Howard’s weaknesses, which included not being 
seen as inspiring, trustworthy or honest and to a lesser extent, not being seen as 
compassionate. It is only with respect to being inspiring and trustworthy that voters 
showed even a slight amount of doubt about Rudd’s leadership qualities, although he 
remained far ahead of Howard on these qualities. The contrasts between perceptions 
of Howard and Rudd on the qualities of compassion and honesty are marked. 
 [Table 27.7 about here] 
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Explaining the vote 
In the final part of the analysis we bring together all of the variables we have been 
assessing to consider the independent impact on the 2007 vote of each one. This is 
achieved through multivariate analysis which estimates the net effect of each factor on 
the vote while controlling for all the others. The analysis includes each of the socio-
demographic variables examined earlier in the chapter, the campaign issues and the 
summary evaluations of the major party leaders, plus party identification. The results 
are presented in Table 27.8 (for simplicity, only variables with statistically significant 
effects are shown). The appendix has the methodological details. 
 [Table 27.8 about here] 
 Of all the variables considered throughout the chapter, the only ones that had 
statistically significant effects on the vote in the 2007 election, net of all the other 
variables in the equation, were party identification, the issues of taxation, industrial 
relations and health, and the evaluations of Howard and Rudd. None of the social 
background variables had any direct impact and nor did most of the campaign issues. 
Indeed, certain issues that were given high importance ratings by voters, including 
education, management of water and the environment more generally, did not feature 
when it came to the acid test of a multivariate analysis. 
 It is difficult to deny the pre-eminent impact of party identification on 
Australian electoral choice. Based on the unstandardised regression coefficient for 
party identification in the first column of Table 27.8, we can see that coalition 
identifiers were 52% more likely than Labor identifiers to vote Liberal-National net of 
all other variables in the model. No other factor comes close to having such a large 
effect. 
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 Nonetheless, the three issues of taxation, industrial relations and health and 
Medicare had significant effects on the vote in 2007. Interestingly, neither industrial 
relations nor taxation was near the top of the importance ratings for issues shown in 
Table 27.5. This finding reinforces the value of relating expressed voter concerns 
about issues directly to the vote in a multivariate analysis. The superficial ratings are 
not always a guide as to which issues really motivated people to vote for a particular 
political party. The issue with the biggest impact was industrial relations. Voters who 
considered industrial relations extremely important and were closer to the Liberal-
National party on the issue were 15% (shown by the unstandardised regression 
coefficient) more likely than those who considered industrial relations extremely 
important and were closer to the Labor Party on the issue to vote for the coalition 
rather than Labor net of all other influences. This finding is not at all unexpected in 
light of the major focus given to industrial relations in the election campaign, 
revolving around debate over the government’s WorkChoices policy.  
There is no doubt that WorkChoices aroused a lot of feeling within the 
electorate. When asked how important a range of different considerations relating to 
the context of the 2007 election were to them in deciding how they would vote, over 
two-thirds (69%) of the AES sample said that ‘the Howard government’s 
WorkChoices legislation’ was very or fairly important. This was in excess of 10% 
more than the consideration rated next most important on the list, rises in interest 
rates. The list also included Labor’s inexperience in government, time for a change, 
the number of trade union leaders there would be in a Labor government and the 
prospect of Labor governments in Canberra and in all the states. In answer to another 
question elsewhere in the questionnaire, 62% of respondents said they disapproved or 
strongly disapproved of the changes associated with WorkChoices. It would have 
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been surprising had industrial relations not featured as an influence on the vote in 
2007.  
Though their impacts were more modest, health and taxation are the two 
issues that preoccupy Australian voters time and time again (see, for example, Bean 
and McAllister 2000; 2005). The issue importance ratings show that health is always 
close to the number one concern for voters, as it was this time, irrespective of how 
much attention the parties give to it. Taxation does not always appear initially to be of 
great concern to the electorate, but it repeatedly shows up as having a net impact on 
the vote. In this case it may have come down to voters being concerned about which 
party would be more likely to honour its promise of income tax cuts. The refreshing 
message of these findings is that voters have their own issue agendas that are not 
wholly determined by what the parties give most attention to during an election 
campaign. Lastly, it is also worth noting that another question in the 2007 AES, 
asking respondents to indicate which of the fourteen issues listed in Table 27.5 was 
most important to them during the election campaign, showed health and Medicare to 
be the top concern, followed by industrial relations and then taxation.  
As is invariably the case, the two major party leaders also had significant 
effects on the 2007 vote. Those who strongly liked Howard were some 21% more 
likely to vote for the coalition rather than Labor compared to those who strongly 
disliked the prime minister. Research has shown that the prime minister of the day 
usually, although not always, has a larger impact than the leader of the opposition 
(Senior and van Onselen 2008, 231-2). Despite the intense focus on Rudd’s leadership 
and his very high level of popularity, this was true in 2007. Perhaps surprisingly, 
Rudd’s effect was only around half the size of Howard’s. Voters who strongly liked 
Rudd were 12% more likely to vote Labor than those who strongly disliked the 
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opposition leader (the negative sign in front of the coefficient in Table 27.8 simply 
indicates the association with voting Labor).  
In addition to estimating their impact on individual vote choice, we can also 
calculate the aggregate electoral impact of the significant issues and leaders and it is 
this that shows the role of these factors in bringing about the Labor Party’s victory. 
The technical details of how these calculations are made are provided in the appendix. 
As we know from Table 27.5, Labor had a substantial advantage over the coalition on 
the issues of industrial relations and health and Medicare. On the other side, the 
coalition had a very small advantage on taxation. The combination of the balance of 
voter opinion strongly favouring Labor on industrial relations and the sizeable impact 
of that issue resulted in a net benefit to the Labor Party of 1.7% of the total vote. The 
issue of health and Medicare added a further 0.7% to the Labor vote. The tax issue 
barely pulled any gain back for the Liberal-National parties, conferring on them a net 
advantage of just 0.1% of the vote. With respect to leadership, while Howard was not 
unpopular with the electorate, nor on balance was he terribly popular, as we saw in 
Table 27.6. On the other hand, even though Rudd had a high popularity rating he did 
not have as large an impact as Howard on voting behaviour. The combination of these 
two factors served to keep the overall impact of leadership at modest levels. 
Nonetheless, Rudd’s substantially greater popularity than Howard told in the end, 
with a net leadership effect of 1.4% to Labor. This advantage to Labor was smaller 
than it would have been, however, had evaluations of the leader of the opposition had 
a greater impact on voters.   
The notable thing about this election is that virtually all of these effects 
favoured Labor. With only the very small effect in the other direction from the tax 
issue, the total combined impact of the significant issues and leader variables sums to 
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3.7% to the Labor Party in the Australian federal election of 2007. On its own, the 
issue of industrial relations accounts for a large part of this net electoral advantage. 
Although 1.7% may not see like a large fraction of the vote in its own right, in relative 
terms this is a big impact for a single issue and it underlines the pivotal nature of the 
government’s WorkChoices policy in the 2007 election outcome. On its own this 
amounts to a substantial part of the 2.7% margin (in two-party preferred terms) by 
which the Australian Labor Party won the election and when we combine all of the 
effects together they more than account for the election result going so decisively to 
Labor.  
 
Appendix 
The data forming the basis of the analysis in this chapter are from the 2007 Australian 
Election Study, conducted by Clive Bean, Ian McAllister and David Gow 
immediately following the federal election (Bean, McAllister and Gow 2008). The 
data come from a national survey of political attitudes and behaviour using a self-
completion questionnaire mailed to respondents the day before the election held on 
Saturday 24 November. The survey was based on a systematic random sample of 
enrolled voters throughout Australia, stratified by state, drawn by the Australian 
Electoral Commission. Non-respondents were sent several follow-up mailings in an 
effort to boost the response rate and the final sample size was 1873, representing a 
response rate of just over 40%. The fieldwork for the study was managed by the 
Australian Social Science Data Archive at the Australian National University. 
The analysis in Table 27.8 employs ordinary least squares regression with 
pairwise deletion of missing data. The dependent variable, first preference vote in the 
2007 federal election, is scored 0 for Labor, 0.5 for minor parties and independent 
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candidates and 1 for Liberal-National. Similarly, party identification is scored 0 for 
Labor, 0.5 for minor parties or no party identification and 1 for Liberal-National. 
Apart from age, scored in years, all other independent variables are either 0-1 dummy 
variables or scaled to run from a low score of 0 to a high score of 1.  
The issue variables are derived from a combination of the importance ratings 
and the party closer to the respondent, so that at one end those who rated the issue as 
extremely important and felt closer to the Labor Party on the issue are scored 0 and at 
the other end of the scale those who rated the issue as extremely important and felt 
closer to the coalition parties on the issue are scored 1.  
The calculations showing the impact of issues on the party balance involves 
multiplying each unstandardised regression coefficient by the amount by which the 
mean of the variable deviates from the neutral point of 0.5. For taxation, the deviation 
was +0.01, for industrial relations it was -0.11 and for health and Medicare the 
deviation was -0.12.  
There are several different ways of calculating leadership effects on the 
balance of the party vote (Senior and van Onselen 2008, 233-6). In this case both 
leader ratings were compared to the neutral point of 0.5 and the difference between 
each leader’s mean rating and 0.5 was multiplied by the unstandardised regression 
coefficient for the leader. So, for Rudd the calculation was 0.63 – 0.5 = 0.13 x -0.12 = 
1.6% to Labor. For Howard, the calculation was 0.51 – 0.5 = 0.01 x 0.21 = 0.2% to 
the coalition. The two were then added together to arrive at the net leadership impact 
on the vote of 1.4% to Labor.  
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Table 27.1: Voter attention to the election campaign 2001 – 2007 (percentages) 
 
 
 
 
 
2001 
 
2004 
 
 
2007 
 
Took ‘a good deal’ of interest in the election 
campaign overall 
 
Cared ‘a good deal’ which party won 
 
Paid ‘a good deal’ or ‘some’ attention to the 
campaign: 
- in newspapers 
- on television 
- on radio 
- on the internet 
 
Used the internet for election news or 
information 
 
Watched the televised leaders’ debate 
 
Thought Howard performed better in the 
debate 
 
 
 
31 
 
65 
 
 
 
53 
69 
43 
- 
 
 
  9 
 
40 
 
 
18 
 
 
30 
 
72 
 
 
 
57 
69 
44 
- 
 
 
12 
 
35 
 
 
25 
 
 
40 
 
76 
 
 
 
61 
77 
50 
16 
 
 
20 
 
46 
 
 
13 
 
Sources: Australian Election Studies, 2001 (n=2010), 2004 (n=1769) and 2007 
(n=1873). 
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Table 27.2: Campaign volatility and partisan loyalty 2001 – 2007 (percentages) 
 
 
 
 
 
2001 
 
2004 
 
 
2007 
 
Decided definitely how to vote during campaign 
period 
 
Seriously thought of giving first preference to 
another party in the House of Representatives 
during election campaign 
 
Always voted for same party 
 
Identifier with one of the major parties 
 
Not a party identifier 
 
Very strong party identifier 
 
 
41 
 
 
 
 
29 
 
48 
 
77 
 
15 
 
19 
 
39 
 
 
 
 
25 
 
50 
 
77 
 
16 
 
21 
 
29 
 
 
 
 
23 
 
45 
 
77 
 
16 
 
25 
 
Sources: Australian Election Studies, 2001 (n=2010), 2004 (n=1769) and 2007 
(n=1873). 
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Table 27.3: Gender, age, residence, religion and vote at the 2007 election 
(percentages) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Labor 
 
Lib.-
Nat. 
 
 
Greens 
 
Other 
 
(N) 
  
 Gender 
Male  
Female 
 
 Age Group 
Under 25 
25 to 44 
45 to 64 
65 and over 
 
 Region 
Rural 
Urban 
 
 Religious Denomination 
Catholic 
Anglican 
Uniting 
Other 
No religion 
 
 Church Attendance 
At least once a month 
At least once a year 
Less than once a year 
Never 
 
 
 
45 
46 
 
 
50 
46 
46 
43 
 
 
39 
48 
 
 
48 
41 
39 
48 
50 
 
 
41 
46 
46 
47 
 
 
44 
42 
 
 
36 
38 
43 
50 
 
 
49 
41 
 
 
42 
51 
54 
37 
32 
 
 
44 
46 
45 
40 
 
 
  7 
  9 
 
 
10 
13 
  8 
  4 
 
 
  6 
  9 
 
 
  8 
  5 
  3 
  8 
15 
 
 
  6 
  5 
  7 
11 
 
 
4 
4 
 
 
4 
4 
4 
4 
 
 
6 
3 
 
 
3 
3 
4 
7 
3 
 
 
9 
2 
2 
3 
 
 
 
(824) 
(905) 
 
 
(107) 
(422) 
(741) 
(387) 
 
 
(494) 
(1254) 
 
 
(466) 
(414) 
(235) 
(220) 
(399) 
 
 
(307) 
(371) 
(325) 
(728) 
 
Source: Australian Election Study, 2007 (n=1873). 
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Table 27.4: Education, employment and vote at the 2007 election (percentages) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Labor 
 
Lib.-
Nat. 
 
 
Greens 
 
Other 
 
(N) 
  
 Education 
No post-school qualifications 
Non-degree qualifications 
University degree 
 
 Occupation 
Manual 
Non-manual 
 
 Employment 
Self-employed 
Government employee 
 
 Trade Union Membership 
Union member 
Not a union member  
 
 
 
47 
43 
47 
 
 
55 
40 
 
 
30 
54 
 
 
63 
40 
 
 
44 
47 
33 
 
 
36 
46 
 
 
59 
31 
 
 
26 
48 
 
 
 
 
   6 
   6 
 16 
 
 
   5 
 10 
 
 
   9 
 10 
 
 
   8 
   8 
 
 
3 
4 
4 
 
 
4 
4 
 
 
3 
4 
 
 
3 
4 
 
 
(496) 
(739) 
(438) 
 
 
(486) 
(1078) 
 
 
(299) 
(408) 
 
 
(398) 
(1211) 
 
Source: Australian Election Study, 2007 (n=1873). 
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Table 27.5: Importance of election issues (percentage describing issue as 
extremely important) and party differential (percentage saying Labor 
closer on issue minus percentage saying Liberal-National closer) at the 
2007 election 
 
 
    
       Importance 
 
 
Issue 
 
 
All 
voters 
 
Labor 
voters 
 
Lib.-
Nat. 
voters 
 
Green 
voters 
 
Other 
voters 
 
Party 
differential 
 
Taxation 
 
Immigration 
 
Education 
 
The environment 
 
Industrial relations 
 
Health and Medicare 
 
Defence and national security 
 
Global warming 
 
Management of water 
 
Unemployment 
 
Treatment of Aborigines 
 
Interest rates 
 
The war in Iraq 
 
Terrorism 
 
 
39 
 
32 
 
68 
 
59 
 
51 
 
76 
 
40 
 
51 
 
70 
 
39 
 
31 
 
43 
 
36 
 
43 
 
36 
 
30 
 
77 
 
69 
 
65 
 
83 
 
34 
 
63 
 
71 
 
42 
 
37 
 
44 
 
43 
 
38 
 
45 
 
35 
 
60 
 
43 
 
38 
 
70 
 
49 
 
33 
 
66 
 
36 
 
20 
 
44 
 
24 
 
50 
 
26 
 
24 
 
68 
 
86 
 
49 
 
76 
 
25 
 
82 
 
79 
 
29 
 
50 
 
26 
 
51 
 
19 
 
 
30 
 
30 
 
70 
 
59 
 
41 
 
73 
 
41 
 
48 
 
64 
 
31 
 
37 
 
33 
 
38 
 
38 
 
-2 
 
+1 
 
+36 
 
+37 
 
+21 
 
+24 
 
-8 
 
+38 
 
+10 
 
-8 
 
+9 
 
-6 
 
+19 
 
-5 
 
Source: Australian Election Study, 2007 (n=1873). 
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Table 27.6: Summary ratings of leaders and parties at the 2007 election (means 
on 0-10 scale) 
 
 
 
Leader 
 
Mean 
 
Std. Dev. 
 
 
Party 
 
Mean 
 
Std. Dev. 
 
Kevin Rudd 
 
John Howard 
 
Mark Vaile 
 
Bob Brown 
 
Peter Costello 
 
Julia Gillard 
 
 
6.3 
 
5.1 
 
4.6 
 
4.5 
 
4.1 
 
5.2 
 
2.8 
 
3.6 
 
2.2 
 
2.8 
 
3.1 
 
3.1 
 
Labor 
 
Liberal 
 
National 
 
Greens 
 
 
 
5.9 
 
5.3 
 
4.4 
 
4.4 
 
3.1 
 
3.4 
 
2.8 
 
3.0 
 
Source: Australian Election Study, 2007 (n=1873). 
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Table 27.7: Leadership qualities ascribed to John Howard and Kevin Rudd at 
the 2007 election (percentage saying quality describes leader extremely 
well or quite well) 
 
 
 
Quality 
 
John Howard 
 
Kevin Rudd 
 
 
Intelligent 
 
Compassionate 
 
Competent 
 
Sensible 
 
Provides strong leadership 
 
Honest 
 
Knowledgeable 
 
Inspiring 
 
Trustworthy 
 
 
90 
 
50 
 
80 
 
73 
 
81 
 
45 
 
81 
 
38 
 
41 
 
92 
 
82 
 
77 
 
82 
 
76 
 
72 
 
82 
 
59 
 
66 
 
Source: Australian Election Study, 2007 (n=1873). 
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 Table 27.8: Multivariate analysis of significant influences on voting behaviour at 
the 2007 election  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Unstandardised 
regression 
coefficient 
  
Standardised 
regression 
coefficient 
 
 
Party identification 
 
Taxation 
 
Industrial relations 
 
Health and Medicare 
 
John Howard 
 
Kevin Rudd 
 
R-squared 
 
 
  .52 
 
  .07 
 
  .15 
 
  .06 
 
  .21 
 
-.12 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.76 
 
  .49 
 
  .05 
 
  .12 
 
  .05 
 
  .16 
 
-.08 
 
 
 
Note: Entries in the table are statistically significant at p < .05 or better.  
Further methodological details can be found in the text and technical 
appendix. 
 
Source: Australian Election Study, 2007 (n=1873). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
